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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues1
This memorandum addresses the victim and witness provisions implemented by the

International Criminal Court (“ICC”) by comparing them with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Court for Rwanda
(“ICTR”), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”). This memorandum is broken into
six major sections: Non-Disclosure of Identity; Protection from Media and Public Photography,
Video and Sketch; Protection from Confrontation with the Accused; Anonymity; Protections for
Victims of Sexual Assault; and Reparations to Victims. Each section identifies and describes the
specific provisions relating to it. This analysis will focus on the general rights under the ICC,
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL (collectively called the “Tribunals”). Additional examples from national
court systems including the United States, Canada, Chile, Australia, South Africa, and the
European Court of Human Rights are also included.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Non-disclosure of witness identity prior to trial has been and should continue
to be a valuable protection measure for the ICC, as the potential problems of
implementing the provision are relatively small and the other Tribunals have
established numerous cases of jurisprudence on the issue.
Each tribunal specifically allows for the protection of non-disclosure prior to trial. The
ICTY trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Perisic stated that the Prosecutor must disclose the identity
1

Victims and Witnesses: Please discuss the victim-based provisions within the Rome Statute. What can the
International Criminal Court learn from the experiences of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL relating to victims and
witnesses and their unique needs? Considering the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, unlike the ICC, do not have specific
provisions allowing for victim participation and reparations, please highlight (1) the benefits and (2) the potential
problems or challenges of the victim-based provisions. In your discussion, please contrast these provisions with the
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL experiences, highlighting the importance of these provisions for a permanent international
court.

1

to the defense no later than 30 days before the trial.2 The ICTR trial chamber in Prosecutor v.
Kajelijeli ruled that the prosecutor must disclose the witness’s identity no later than 21 days
before trial.3 The SCSL trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Gbao ruled that witness disclosure to the
defense would be most appropriate on a rolling basis. The Court then ruled that witness identity
must be disclosed 42 days prior to testimony.4 However, this was shortened to a 21 day rolling
basis in Prosecutor v. Norman.5 Under the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 76 states
that disclosure of witnesses must take place sufficiently in advance to allow proper preparation
time for the defense.6 The specific requirement determining when the prosecution must disclose
witness identity will be decided when it is brought up to the trial chamber.
2. Protection from media and public photography, video and sketch is a very
important protection measure for the ICC, although it must be strictly
monitored to ensure its compliance and ability to protect victims and
witnesses.
Rule 87 of the ICC follows the ICTY and ICTR rules nearly word for word and provides
specific measures that can be adopted to prevent disclosure to the public or media. Both the
ICTR and ICTY have an identical Rule 75 that provides measures to protect victims and
2

Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No.: IT-04-81, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Protective Measures for Witnesses
(ICTY Trial Chamber May 27, 2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
3

Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No.: ICTR-98-44-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Protective Measures for
Witnesses (ICTR Trial Chamber July 6, 2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24]
4

Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No.: SCSL-2003-09-PT, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Immediate Protective
Measures for Witnesses and Victims and for Non-Public Disclosure (SCSL Trial Chamber Oct. 10, 2003).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]
5

Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No.: SCSL-2004-14-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Modification of
Protective Measures for Witnesses (SCSL Trial Chamber June 8, 2004) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 30]
6

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 76. [hereinafter ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3]

2

witnesses from the public and media. The SCSL Rule 75 is again similar to the ICTY and ICTR
Rule 75. The one difference is that the SCSL rule expands “testimony through image- or voicealtering devices or closed circuit television” to include “video link or other technology.”7
Accordingly, this allows for witnesses to testify from another location other than the courtroom
via video link, adding more security for the witness.
3. Protection from confrontation with the accused is a protection measure that
is attractive to the Tribunals since it protects witnesses, especially those who
have been severely traumatized, without restricting the accused’s rights by
much as granting complete anonymity.
In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the trial chamber called for the installation of temporary screens
in the courtroom so the witness could not see the accused, but the accused could see the witness
via a monitor.8 Thus, even though Rule 75 allows for closed circuit television, it seems from the
Tadic case that the ICTY will use screens instead. Under the ICTR, this notion is in direct
conflict with the right of the accused to face the prosecution’s witnesses as provided for in
Article 20 of the ICTR Statute.9 However, the courts must balance this with the rights of
witnesses. This is especially true in cases of sexual violence. The SCSL in Prosecutor v. Sesay
allowed certain witnesses to testify from behind screens.10 The ICC does not allow for the use of
screens in the courtroom in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. However, screens probably
7

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rule 69 (2003). [hereinafter SCSL Rules
of Procedure and Evidence] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]

8

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for
Victims and Witnesses (ICTY Trial Chamber Aug. 10, 1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
36]
9

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR Res. 955, art. 20 (1994). [hereinafter ICTR
Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
10

Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No.: SCSL-2004-15-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Modification of Protective
Measures for Witnesses (SCSL Trial Chamber July 5, 2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34]

3

should be adopted so that judges can properly monitor witnesses, the accused can confront the
witness, and the witness can feel protected from not having to confront the accused.
4. Allowing complete anonymity to witnesses will be a very contentious issue, as
evidenced by the ICTY, the only tribunal to grant this measure, and the
source of much criticism for allowing this protection measure.
The ICC does not allow for anonymity in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Moreover, Article 68 of the Rome Statute states that protection measures must not be prejudicial
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. In accordance with
the Rome Statute, the ICC should not allow for anonymity. However, even though Article 20(1)
of the ICTY states that the protections must be in full respect for the rights of the accused, the
trial chambers in the Tadic case allowed for witnesses to be completely anonymous.11 The
Courts in the ICTR and the SCSL have not yet had to rule on granting anonymity to witnesses.
5. The ICC has created novel provisions for victims of sexual assault, which will
prove extremely useful in cases of sexual violence.
Rule 68(1) of the ICC is novel because it states a number of factors that the Court must
take into consideration when granting the “appropriate measures” of protection, including age,
gender, health, and the nature of the crime (like sexual violence).12 Rule 68(2) states that special
measures of protection shall be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence.13 This
indicates a presumption for protective measures in cases of sexual assault. Thus, the burden is
on defense to prove that the measures shouldn’t be afforded. This presumption however is not
11

Tadic, supra note 8. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36]

12

ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 6, Rule 68(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 3]

13

ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 6, Rule 68(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 3]

4

found in the other Tribunals. Rule 43(6) of the ICC is similar to the SCSL rule in stating the
Victims and Witnesses Unit shall include staff with expertise in trauma, including that related to
sexual violence crimes.14 The ICTY and ICTR simply provide for hiring women to the staff.
Rule 96 of the ICTY and ICTR states that no corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be
required and that prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence.15 This is
in essence a rape shield rule. The SCSL only provides that no prior sexual conduct of the victim
shall be admitted.
6. Granting reparations for victims has the potential to be an extremely
successful aspect of the ICC, though several formidable issues exist due to its
originality within the Tribunals.
The ICC includes novel provisions for victims and witnesses. Rule 75 allows for
reparations to victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.16 Also, to ensure
that victims are adequately compensated, Rule 79 specifically calls for the establishment of a
trust fund. Finally, Rule 68(3) allows victims to present their views and concerns to the court.
The rule specifically allows this to be done by the representatives of the victims. None of the
other Tribunals have provided reparations to victims.

14

ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 6, Rule 43(6). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 3]

15

Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT/32/Rev.
36, Rule 96 (1994). [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence] Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 4]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rule 96
(1995). [hereinafter ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5]

16

ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 6, Rule 75. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab

3]
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II.

INTRODUCTION
The protections of victims and witnesses have evolved from the inception of the ICTY

and continue through to the creation of the ICC. The ICTY set the benchmark on victim and
witness protection through reliance on varying national court systems as well as on international
standards. The ICTY’s approach has been followed by the ICTR and the SCSL, though each
tribunal made important advances in victim and witness protection.
The ICC has continued to follow the lead of the other tribunals. Since the ICC has yet to
hear a case and issue a decision, it is still unknown how well the ICC will protect victims and
witnesses. If the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are any indication, however, the ICC will
provide proper protection measures for victims and witnesses in the international tribunal arena.

III.

NON-DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITY
A. General Discussion of Non-Disclosure under the ICC
Rule 76 allows for non-disclosure of a witness’s identity. It states that the prosecutor

must disclose the identity of witnesses who are intending to testify and that this must occur
“sufficiently in advance to enable the adequate preparation of the defence (sic).”17 The specific
requirement that determines when the prosecution must disclose witness identity will not be
decided until it is brought up to the trial chamber. However, the ICC will be able to look to the
other tribunals for insight.

17
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B. History of Non-Disclosure
1. ICTY
Article 22 of the Statute of the ICTY and Rule 69 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure
specifically allows for the non-disclosure of identity.18 Unlike the ICTR, Rule 69 of the ICTY
only calls for the Prosecutor to request this protection.19 In 1997, the trial chamber in Prosecutor
v. Delalic ruled that the defense must disclose its witnesses to the prosecution.20 The trial
chamber reasoned that the defense’s obligations are much different from the prosecution’s
obligations, and judges drafted all these rules with full respect to victims and witnesses.21 In
1998, however, the Court in Prosecutor v. Blaskic modified this rule and allowed the defense to
apply for non-disclosure protections for its witnesses as well.22 In that decision, the defense
argued that testimony from witnesses for the defense may be contrary to the interests of the
government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus creating a greater risk.23 The trial
chamber noted that the ICTY had an obligation to ensure effective protection for the witnesses of
both the prosecution and the defense, and based on the reasonable arguments given by the
defense non-disclosure, the trial chamber granted non-disclosure protection to the defense
witnesses to any third parties.24
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Similar to the ICC, Rule 69 of the ICTY does not state the specific time frame for
disclosure to the defense. Instead, it simply states that a person’s identity must be disclosed to
the accused so that he or she has adequate time to prepare for cross-examination.25 This issue,
though, was resolved in Prosecutor v. Perisic.26 There, the trial chamber reiterated that Rule 69
allows for delayed disclosure of witness identity only in exceptional circumstances and that the
identity of the victim or witness must be disclosed in sufficient time to allow defense to prepare
for trial. In fact, in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, the trial chamber denied a non-disclosure request by
the Prosecution because they failed to show exceptional circumstances.27
The ICTY identified three issues that must be taken into consideration. First, the court
must look at the likelihood that the prosecution witness will be interfered with or intimidated
once their identity is made known to defense. As the trial chamber noted in Prosecutor v.
Brdanin, the longer the time between the disclosure of the witness identity and the time when the
witness is to give evidence, the more potential for interference with that witness.28 Second, a
distinction must be drawn between measures to protect individual victims and witnesses in the
particular trial, which are permissible under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and measures
that simply make it easier for the Prosecution to bring cases against other persons in the future,
which are not. Again, the Brdanin Court emphasized that blanket protection measures are far too
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lenient and the rights of the accused must remain the first consideration of the ICTY.29 Finally,
the court must decide the length of time prior to the trial that the identity of the victims and
witnesses must be disclosed to the accused. Thus, even though the Brdanin Court realized that
witness harassment is much more likely the longer their names have been disclosed, the ICTY
must still create a reasonable time to allow the defense to properly prepare for crossexamination.30 From this, the trial chamber in Perisic concluded that the Prosecutor must
disclose the identity of witnesses under Rule 69’s protection to the defense no later than 30 days
before the trial.31
2. ICTR
Similar to the ICTY, non-disclosure is specifically provided for in Article 21 of the ICTR
statute as well as Rule 69.32 Under Rule 69, either party can apply to trial chamber for this
protection.33 Once again, the trial court had to decide the appropriate time frame for disclosing
witness identity. The prosecutor in Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli recommended that the trial court
allow disclosure to occur seven days before trial.34 The trial chamber ruled that seven days was
not adequate time to prepare a defense and instead ruled that the prosecutor must disclose the
witness’s identity no later than 21 days before trial.35 The trial chamber in Kajelijeli even
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modified the defense’s request for 60 days down to 21 days, aiding the defense witnesses and
showing the ICTR’s commitment to this protection measure.36 In fact, the trial chamber noted
that it was a “normal measure” for defense witnesses.37 Twenty-one days seems to be the basis
at the ICTR, through an earlier decision by the trial chamber ruled that disclosure must occur
within 15 days before trial.38 Non-disclosure is not granted in every instance, though, as was
reiterated in Musema v. Prosecutor.39 There, the Appeals Chamber ruled that Rule 69 stipulates
that there must be exceptional circumstances that warrant the non-disclosure of witness
identity.40 Moreover, the ICTR looks to the security situation when granting non-disclosure
protection.41
3. SCSL
Rule 69 of the SCSL Rules of Procedure also specifically allows for the non-disclosure of
identity.42 Unlike the ICTY, but similar to the ICTR, the rule states that either party may apply
for this protection for witnesses. In Prosecutor v. Gbao, the Court ruled that witness disclosure
to the defense would be most appropriate on a rolling basis.43 As stated earlier, the ICTY and the
ICTR required disclosure to occur 30 and 21 days respectively prior to the beginning of trial.
36
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The SCSL decided that witness identity should be disclosed 42 days prior to that witness’s
testimony.44 In its decision, the trial court stated that it was attempting to balance the interests of
the victims and witnesses with the pre-eminent interest of the accused’s right to a fair and public
trial.45 Thus, even though the trial chamber in Gbao noted the unique security situation of
having the court in the country where the atrocities were committed, it demanded that the
prosecution disclose witness identity twice as early as the prosecution had requested. However,
the SCSL later decided that the 42 days was too long. Therefore, in Prosecutor v. Norman, the
trial chamber ruled that disclosure must be only 21 days before a witness is scheduled to
testify.46 This ruling greatly restricted the defense from obtaining witness identification. The
trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Fofana followed the decision in Norman granting non-disclosure
protection until 21 days prior to testimony.47
C. Benefits of Non-Disclosure
1. Protection from accused during the early part of the trial
The protection of non-disclosure of a witness is very beneficial. First, it protects witnesses
and victims from the accused during the early part of the trial process, which can be lengthy.
Witnesses and victims can feel secure during this time period knowing that their identities are
safe from the accused as well as from the media. Probably the most significant benefit of this
provision is that it does not interfere with the trial process itself. Instead, this protection is a
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preliminary step in securing the safety of victims and witnesses. If properly applied, this
protection will not hinder the defense from being able to properly prepare for cross-examination.
2. Provides extra time for the Victims and Witnesses Unit to accommodate
victims and witnesses
Furthermore, non-disclosure allows the Victims and Witnesses Unit extra time to set up
any other protections and accommodations that may be needed. For example, if witnesses are
able to travel to the ICC prior to their identities being released, this may be an important security
measure for the Victims and Witnesses Unit, as virtually all victims and witnesses will be
required to fly or otherwise travel to The Hague. The Witness and Victims Support Section of
the ICTR had facilitated the travel of over 150 witnesses to Arusha from over 10 countries.48
The Victims and Witness Unit of the ICC will surely have similar obligations. Many victims and
witnesses may fear traveling to the ICC if the accused knows their identities. Therefore, nondisclosure may aid in bringing witnesses to the Court.
D. Possible Challenges of Non-Disclosure
1. The ICC should allow the Defense to apply for this provision
All three tribunals allow the defense to apply for this protection measure. The ICTY
provision only states that the prosecutor can request the protection, similar to the ICC provision.
However, as stated earlier, the ICTY ruled in Prosecutor v. Blaskic that the defense can also
apply for non-disclosure protections. Therefore, it seems only appropriate that the Court also
permit the defense to apply for this provision under Rule 76. However, this cannot be confirmed
until a case arises where the defense seeks this protection for its witnesses. At that time, the trial
court will have to make a determination. If the trial court rules against allowing the defense to
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utilize Rule 76, the ruling could create a controversy. It is also possible that Rule 76 be amended
so that it comports with Rule 69 of the ICTR and SCSL. This would eliminate any controversy,
but may be more difficult to implement.
2. The ICC must determine the appropriate time for disclosure
The key challenge for non-disclosure provision is that the Court will have to determine
what length of time is adequate for the defense to prepare for cross-examination. This challenge
does not become any easier when looking to the other Tribunals, as each tribunal has determined
a different timeframe. Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible to compare the three as the
SCSL has created a rolling timeframe; the ICTY demands disclosure 30 days prior to trial, while
the ICTR requires disclosure 21 days before trial. The rolling time frame may be the most
beneficial to the witness. For example, if witness X is slated to testify last in the Prosecution’s
case, having his identity released 21 or 30 days before trial will mean that his identity may be
known by the defense for months before he testifies. Conversely, if witness Y is set to testify
first at trial, he might rather have the 21 or 30 day notice before the trial begins, instead of a 21
day rolling-basis notice. Theoretically, though, the rolling basis is most beneficial because it
imposes the same burden on each witness, as each witness’s identity will be disclosed the same
amount of time before their respective testimonies. In practice, though, this may prove
problematic. For example, the Prosecution will not be able to precisely state which day each
witness will testify. Thus, the Prosecution will be forced to err on the safe side and disclose a
witness’s identity at least 21 days before testimony, even though the testimony may not take
place for another 60 days. This will also place a burden on the Court to keep track of the
process. A simpler process may be to set a specific time before trial as the ICTY and ICTR have

13

done. The only problem with this approach is that a witness’s identity may be known for months
before he or she actually testifies. Ultimately, this will be a decision for the ICC to decide.
E. Conclusion
Non-disclosure of identity will undoubtedly continue to be one of the most frequently
employed protection measures at the ICC. The other Tribunals have used this protection
measure with success, though each has implemented the measure differently. The trial chamber
of the ICC must look to the other Tribunals’ jurisprudence, and eventually decide how to
implement this protection measure.

IV.

PROTECTION FROM PUBLIC AND MEDIA
A. General Discussion of Protection from Public and Media under the ICC
Rule 87 specifically allows for the protection from public or media of any victim, witness

or “other person at risk on account of testimony given by a witness…”49 Under this rule, a
chamber may provide five different protection mechanisms. First, the Court may decide to
expunge the name or any identifying information of a witness from the public records.50 Second,
the Court may prohibit the prosecution, the defense or any other participant in the proceedings
from disclosing identifying information to a third party.51 Third, testimony may be given via
electronic or other special means. This includes the use of voice and/or picture alteration,
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videoconferencing, closed-circuit television, and exclusive use of the sound media.52 Fourth, the
Court may provide a pseudonym to be used instead of the person’s actual name.53 Fifth, the
Court may decide to hold part of its proceedings on camera.
B. History of Protection from Public and Media
1. National Jurisdictions
The Tribunals are not the first to adopt protective measures from the public and media.
Many national courts allow for this protection as well. For example, Chile allows courts to
change the identity of witnesses in serious cases.54 Canada also allows the court to order the
protection from the public.55 In fact, Canada also provides in its statute that witnesses may
testify behind a screen in the courtroom.56 This procedure has been adopted by the other
Tribunals, as will be discussed below. South Africa also provides for non-disclosure to the
public if it appears that harm will likely result from the testimony.57 Also, courts in the United
States have declared that an accused’s right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment is not an
absolute right, and can be restricted in the interests of justice.58
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2. International Conventions
Besides national courts, international conventions also discuss the protection of witnesses
from the public and media. Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and Article 6(1) of the European Covenant on Human Rights both state that the media and
public may be excluded in the interest of protection of the parties.59 The Tribunals in
interpreting the rules pertaining to this protection have used much of this information.
3. ICTY
Under the ICTY, Rule 75 specifically states measures that can be adopted to prevent
disclosure to the public or media. Such measures listed are: expunging names and identifying
information from the public records; non-disclosure of records which identify the victim;
testimony through image- or voice- altering devices or closed circuit television; and assigning a
pseudonym.60 These protection measures are nearly identical to the ICC provisions. One major
technological advantage in the ICTY’s protection measure is that the broadcast is released after a
delay of 30 minutes. This allows the parties to seek redaction of any inadvertent reference to a
protected witness or to potentially identifying information.61 Another benefit is that this
protective order may continue throughout the proceedings, or even after the proceedings are
concluded.62
The chambers of the ICTY were quick to utilize these protection measures for the
Prosecution witnesses. In the Tadic case alone, the trial chamber ordered closed sessions for 13
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witnesses and facial distortion for eight witnesses.63 Measures were also used in Prosecutor v.
Boskoski to protect witnesses from the media.64 However, it eventually became apparent that
defense witnesses might also deserve this protection. In Prosecutor v. Delalic, the trial chamber
stated, “The Trial Chamber has exercised this power for the protection of witnesses for the
Prosecution and it is incumbent upon it to give equal consideration from the Defence.”65 It then
ordered non-disclosure of the defense witness’s name to the media, as well as adopting a
pseudonym for him. In its decision, the trial chamber stated that objective fear of a witness is a
sufficient basis to grant protective measures such as non-disclosure to the public and media.66
The ICTY will not provide for this provision carte blanch, however. In Prosecutor v. Boskoski,
the trial chamber granted protection from the public and media for only one of the Annexes
requested, and stated that the other was so general in nature that the public and media should be
free to have access to it.67 Another important aspect of this protection is that the trial chamber
decides how long the protections last.68
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4. ICTR
Rule 75 of the ICTR is identical to rule 75 of the ICTY.69 In implementing these
measures, the ICTR looks at the context of the entire security situation affecting the concerned
witness, and demands that there be a real fear and objective basis for the fear.70 Moreover, the
trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli states that it is solely the decision of the chamber, not
that of the witness, to “determine how long a pseudonym is to be used…”71 The ICTR also
allowed the defense to request protection from the public and media. In Prosecutor v.
Kayishema, the trial chamber granted the defense’s request because the witnesses for the defense
feared reprisals for openly testifying about the 1994 Rwandan genocide.72 The trial chamber in
Prosecutor v. Musema further bolstered this decision when it stated that the security situation in
and around Rwanda was a factor in granting protection from the public and media.73
5. SCSL
The SCSL Rule 75 is again similar to the ICTY and ICTR Rule 75. The one difference is
that the SCSL rule expands “testimony through image- or voice- altering devices or closed
circuit television” to include “video link or other technology.”74 Accordingly, this allows for
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witnesses to testify from a location other than the courtroom via video link, adding more security
to the witness. The trial chamber granted protective measures of this type in Prosecutor v.
Sesay.75 There, non-disclosure of names or identifying information as well as applying
pseudonyms was granted. The trial chamber noted that Sierra Leone is different from the other
Tribunals because it sits in the country where the crimes were allegedly committed.76 Therefore,
it seems that the SCSL may be more sensitive to the needs of victims and witnesses by
specifically stating the possibility of using other technologies to protect victims and witnesses
from the public and media.
C. Benefits of Protection from Public and Media
The general benefit of this protection is very apparent; it keeps victims and witnesses safe
from the public and media. However, another major benefit to this protection is that it still
allows the accused to know the identity of the witnesses testifying against him. This measure is
much less intrusive from the accused’s point of view as the accused will still be able to fully
prepare to cross-examine these witnesses. Therefore, this measure may be used much more
liberally than a measure that grants complete anonymity of a witness where the accused will not
know the identity of the accusers.
D. Possible Challenges of Protection from Public and Media
A major challenge to this protective measure is ensuring its compliance throughout all
stages of the trial, and even afterwards. All of the other Tribunals have used the protection with
success. However, there is always a chance that someone may “leak” a name to the media. If
names are disclosed, then witnesses may be in real danger. In fact, two witnesses who testified
74
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in the Akayesu and the Ruzindana cases from the ICTR were killed.77 This prompted the ICTR
to reinforce security measures as well as strengthen the cooperation with the government of
Rwanda.78 The ICTR also pushed for establishing a special unit for transporting witnesses with
unmarked vehicles.79 Also, in November 2000, two Croat newspapers published excerpts from
testimony given by a witness in the Blaskic case who had been granted protective measures.80
After this, the ICTY charged five journalists with “‘knowingly and willfully’ publishing the
name of a protected witness, and…publishing excerpts from private testimony by that witness.”81
Contempt under the ICTY is punishable by up to seven years in prison or fines up to $120,000.82
Because of these incidents, there must be ample insurance that names will not be disclosed.
Moreover, the Court must determine the proper sanctions or punishments if it finds out that
someone has disclosed a protected witness’s identity.
E. Conclusion
Protection from the public and media has been another common protection measure at the
other Tribunals. The other Tribunals have used this measure successfully, though there have
been notable exceptions, as discussed above. If the ICC can properly ensure that protections
from media and public are adhered to, this can be a very valuable measure.
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V.

Protection from Confrontation with the Accused
A. General Discussion of Witness Protection from Confrontation with the Accused
under the ICC
Rule 87(3)(c) allows for a witness to testify through electronic means.83 This means that

a witness may testify outside of the courtroom. Rule 87(3), though, states that this protection
measure is in response to public or media protection. Therefore, the ICC does not explicitly
allow for the victim or witness to be protected from a confrontation with the accused. However,
Rule 88(5) does provide that a Chamber must be “vigilant in controlling the manner of
questioning.”84 Again, however, this section relates to victims of special crimes such as sexual
violence. The question thus becomes: How should the ICC rule when confronted with a request
to allow a witness to testify without specifically confronting the accused? As will be discussed
below, the other Tribunals have allowed for such measures as installing screens in the courtroom
to shield the victim from viewing the accused. The ICC does not allow for the use of screens in
the courtroom in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. However, this approach should be
adopted so that judges can properly monitor witnesses, the accused can confront the witness, and
the witness can feel protected from not having to confront the accused.
B. History of Witness Protection from Confrontation with the Accused
1. ICTY and ICTR
Both the ICTY and ICTR specifically allow for measures to protect victims and witnesses
from the accused. Rule 75 (B)(iii) of both the ICTY and ICTR states that a chamber may order
appropriate measures such as one-way closed circuit television. This would allow the witness to
83
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testify outside of the courtroom without seeing the accused while still allowing the accused and
the chamber to monitor the witness. However, this approach was never really used by the ICTY.
Instead, the trial chamber in the Tadic case decided that the installation of temporary screens in
the courtroom would be more appropriate. These screens, designed so the witness cannot see the
accused, but the accused can see the witness via a monitor, were determined to be a better
solution than using closed circuit television.85 The Chamber reasoned that having the witness
actually in the courtroom was very important to insuring a proper trial, as the judges would be
able to better monitor the witness in person. However, the Tadic Court did establish two criteria
for allowing video-conferencing: the testimony must be so important that it would be unfair to
proceed without it; and the witness must be unable or unwilling to testify in the courtroom.86
In Prosecutor v. Delalic, the trial chamber reiterated the validity of using screens in the
courtroom as a protective measure against confronting the accused.87 There, witness “B” was a
detainee at the Celebici Camp. The chamber reasoned that the Prosecutor’s motion to allow
witness “B” to testify from a remote witness room constituted a request for partial anonymity.88
Witness “B” was extremely worried about additional security risks to his family, and he had been
extremely traumatized from his experience at Celebici.89 The chamber noted that, if granted, the
accused’s right to confront witnesses testifying against him would be partially compromised. So,
the chamber forced witness “B” to testify in the courtroom in an open session, but with the use of
85

Tadic, supra note 8. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36]

86

Rydberg, Asa, The Protection of the Interests of Witnesses – The ICTY in Comparison to the Future ICC, 12
Leiden J. Int’l L. 455, 471 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 73]
87

Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No.: IT-96-21, Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective Measures
for the Prosecution Witnesses Pseudonymed “B” through to “M” (ICTY Trial Chamber Apr. 29, 1997) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]

88

Id.

89

Id.

22

a protective screen. This, the chamber concluded, was a proper balance between the rights of the
accused and the safety of the witness.90 Thus, the Delalic case added a third requirement to the
Tadic criteria: the accused must not be prejudiced in the exercise to confront the witness.91
Therefore, the three criteria the ICTY set forth through the Tadic and Delalic cases are as
follows: The testimony must be so important that it would be unfair to proceed without it; The
witness must be unable or unwilling to testify in the courtroom; and The accused must not be
prejudiced in the exercise to confront the witness.
2. SCSL
In Prosecutor v. Norman, the trial chamber of the SCSL stated that screens do, to a small
degree, negatively affect the public nature of the trial, and thus hinder the accused’s right to a
public trial.92 The chamber, in noting the preference for public hearings, stated that this
preference must be balanced with the interest of protecting victims and witnesses. In the end, the
chamber ruled that the use of screens “is a reasonable…and sensible way” to balance the right of
the accused to a public hearing with the importance of protecting victims and witnesses.93 The
trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Norman was challenged by the defense on its decision.
Regardless, the chamber stuck with its original decision.94 The chamber was confident that it
made a balanced evaluation between the rights of the accused and the importance of protecting
the witnesses and victims.95 The trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Sesay followed the Norman

90

Id.

91

Rydberg, supra note 86, 471. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 73]

92

Norman, supra note 5. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30]

93

Id.

94

Norman, supra note 46. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31]

95

Id.

23

court’s reasoning and allowed certain witnesses to testify from behind screens.96 Both the
Norman and Sesay decisions also emphasized the fact that the SCSL was located in the same
country in which the atrocities took place, thus making protective measures even more
important.97
Besides testifying behind screens, Rule 75 of the SCSL allows for witnesses to testify
from outside of the courtroom via video link.98 This can help protect a witness from the trauma
of being confronted by the accused, or even being in his or her presence. This provision proves
especially beneficial for children, as was evidenced when the chamber in Prosecutor v. Sesay
granted this protection measure for child witnesses.99
Again, the use of screens was not novel to the Tribunals. Other countries, such as
Canada, allow for this protective measure. In Canada, though, only children (under 18 years of
age) are allowed to testify behind screens.100
C. Benefits of Witness Protection from Confrontation with the Accused
Obviously, this protection measure allows witnesses the opportunity to be free from
confronting the accused. As has been documented in the cases above, this measure is a major
attraction to many victims and witnesses, but especially to child victims and victims of sexual
violence. At the same time, the use of screens can also benefit the accused. As with video-link,
it allows for a similar courtroom atmosphere. It also allows the judges to better observe the
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demeanor of the witness, insuring a fair trial. However, the benefit of testifying via video-link is
more beneficial to extremely traumatized victims and witnesses. It allows these people to testify
in a safe location and to be completely separated from the accused. Deciding which approach is
correct depends largely on the factors present.
D. Possible Challenges of Witness Protection from Confrontation with the Accused
The primary challenge with this protection measure comes in balancing the rights of the
accused with the need to protect victims and witnesses. The two primary rights of the accused
that are of concern are the right to confront the witness and the right to a public trial. Both of
these rights are enumerated in Article 67 of the Rome Statute.101 Thus, the ICC will have to
confront this issue and determine which witnesses deserve the protection of non-confrontation
with the accused. It will be helpful for the ICC to look at the precedents set by the other
Tribunals, such as the three criteria created by the ICTY.
E. Conclusion
Even though the ICC does not explicitly allow for the victim or witness to be protected
from a confrontation with the accused, this protection measure should be afforded. The other
Tribunals have created a strong jurisprudence for this protection measure. Additionally, the
other Tribunals expanded this protection to allow for testimony from behind screens in an effort
to help ensure a fair trial. The ICC should look to the other Tribunals’ decisions and follow their
lead.
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VI.

ANONYMITY
A. General Discussion of Anonymity under the ICC
Anonymity is not specifically discussed in the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Instead, Article 64(6)(e) simply states that the trial chamber may provide protection for victims
and witnesses.102 Likewise, Article 68(1) states that the Court shall “take appropriate measures
to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and
witnesses.”103 However, the article goes on to state “these measures shall not be prejudicial to or
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair trial and impartial trial.”104 As will be
discussed below, this “balancing test” provision is nearly identical to that of the ICTY’s
provision. Moreover, the ICC provides instances where the balancing test is not necessary.
Article 68(2) affirms that special measures of protection shall be implemented in cases involving
victims of sexual violence.105 The wording of this article ensures that protections will
automatically be put in place. This shifts the burden to the defense to prove that the measures
decided by the Court should not be afforded. Therefore, Article 68 allows the possibility of
anonymous witnesses testifying at the ICC.
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B. History of Anonymity
1. ICTY
Dusko Tadic was the first person tried at the ICTY. He was charged with thirty-four
counts of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, and
Crimes Against Humanity, including murder, rape and torture of Muslim men and women.106
During the pre-trial motions, the trial chamber ruled that two witnesses who had been victims of
sexual assault could testify anonymously; it was reported that these witnesses were forced to
participate in sexual mutilation.107 Two other witnesses’ identities were determined not to be
essential to the trial as they were chance observers.108 The trial chamber noted Article 20(1) of
the ICTY statute that states the court must give “full respect for the rights of the accused and due
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”109 The trial chamber noted that in general,
all evidence must be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing. However, the
trial chamber emphasized that a “fair trial means not only fair treatment to the defendant but also
to the prosecution and to the witnesses.”110 From this, the trial chamber ruled that the anonymity
of these witnesses was necessary because the ICTY could not guarantee the safety of the
witnesses “due to a lack of a fully-funded and operational witness protection programme.”111
The court in Tadic created five requirements in order for anonymity to be allowed. First,
there must be a real fear for safety. Second, the witness’s testimony must be important to the
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prosecutor’s case. Third, there must be no prima facie evidence that the witness is
untrustworthy. Fourth, the Court must determine the ineffectiveness of a witness protection
program. Fifth, the Court must decide that the measures taken are strictly necessary.112 The
Court also added four guidelines to be followed when evidence is taken from anonymous
witnesses. First, the judges must be able to observe the demeanor of the witness. Second, the
judges must be aware of the witness’s identity in order to test his or her reliability. Third, the
accused must be allowed ample opportunity to question the witness on issues unrelated to his or
her identity. Finally, the witness’s identity must be released when the reasons for requiring the
anonymity are over. With these factors, the court ruled that anonymity does not violate Article
21(4) as long as the defense is given ample opportunity to question the anonymous witness.113
Regardless of the national court systems that allow for anonymity and the
groundbreaking Tadic decision, there has been limited use of this protection in the Tribunals. In
Prosecutor v. Delalic, the court ruled that the right of the accused to face his accusers cannot be
compromised except in the public interest and to uphold public policy.114 Moreover, the court in
Prosecutor v. Blaskic stated that the court shall apply only those protections that are absolutely
necessary.115 The ICTY and the SCSL have yet to rule on granting anonymity to witnesses.
2. European Court and National Courts
These guidelines are reflected in the Kotovski v. The Netherlands decision. There, the
European Court concluded that the disadvantages that an accused faces when addressing the
evidence of an anonymous witness can be overcome by appropriate safeguards provided by the
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trial court.116 The decision underscored the increasing violent, organized crime that has led
witnesses to fear reprisals. It also stated that the Commission on Threatened Witnesses, created
in 1984 by the Minister of Justice, concluded that while the law should forbid the use of
anonymous witnesses in principle, there may be exceptions where “the witness would run an
unacceptable risk if his or her identity were known.”117 That ruling is essentially the basis of the
Tadic decision.
Certain national courts also allow for anonymity. Chile allows witnesses who appear
voluntarily to request anonymity.118 The court then decides if the situation warrants the request.
English law also provides for this protection in exceptional circumstances.119 Denmark did allow
for anonymity after an historical Supreme Court ruling in 1983.120 However, this protection was
short lived; it was outlawed in 1986.121 The United States does not permit the use of anonymous
witnesses, even when the witness’s safety has been threatened.122 Instead, the United States
court system relies on protective measures.
C. Benefits of Anonymity
Granting anonymity is the ultimate protection to fearful witnesses. Many victims would
be fearful of confronting their assailants. This protection is even more essential when
considering the fears held by victims of sexual violence. The UN Special Rapporteur on
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violence against women stated that “[s]evere traumatization, feelings of guilt and shame are
accompanied by the fear of rejection by husband or family and by the fear of reprisals against
themselves and their families.”123 In fact, this reality is evidenced in the Tadic case where one of
the witnesses was granted anonymity but still refused to testify.124
Offering anonymity aids the ICC in meeting its objectives. It was stated that the ICTY
had three functions: “to do justice, to deter further crimes and to contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of international peace.”125 Professor Chinkin argues that the unwillingness of
witnesses to testify prevents the ICTY from successfully prosecuting those who have been
indicted, thus undermining the objectives of the tribunal.126 This analysis parallels the work of
the ICC as it works to administer justice, deter heinous crimes and promote international peace.
The failure of witnesses to testify will undermine these objectives.
D. Possible Challenges of Anonymity
1. Anonymity is not specifically authorized in the Rome Statute or the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence
Similar to the other Tribunals, the ICC does not specifically authorize the use of
anonymous witness testimony in either the Rome Statute or the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. Critics may argue, as they have for the ICTY, that the ICC should not create this
option. In formulating the Rome Statute, nations had ample opportunity to insert an anonymous
witness provision. Other specific provisions are listed in the Rome Statute. Therefore, had the
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drafters of the Rome Statute wished to provide for anonymous testimony, they would have
included it just as they included other provisions.
2. Allowing anonymous testimony will conflict with the notion of providing the
accused with a fair trial
Article 67 of the ICC specifically provides that the accused shall have the right “to
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him.”127 Critics may argue that the right to
cross-examine witnesses cannot be effectively conducted without the knowledge of the identity
of the witness.128 Others argue that allowing anonymous testimony may give the appearance of
guilt instead of affording presumption of innocence.129 Moreover, Article 68 of the Rome
Statute states that protection measures must not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused and a fair and impartial trial.130 By allowing witnesses to testify anonymously, it is
argued, the accused will be prejudiced by not knowing the identity of the witnesses. Knowledge
of witness identity is important for many reasons. First, it allows the accused to mount a
complete defense to the testimony given by conducting background searches of the witness.
Second, the accused will be better able to specifically refute testimony made by the witness if the
accused has personal knowledge of the situation and the person involved. This can be done on
cross-examination of the witness as well as through the testimony of the accused. Also,
knowledge of a witness’s identity gives more legitimacy to the specific trial. Besides these
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considerations, the ability of the Court to ensure the legitimacy of the witness’s statement is vital
to a proper trial. The best way to ensure the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony is by
allowing the accused, his or her counsel, as well as the judges, to monitor the witness.
E. Conclusion
Allowing completely anonymous testimony is a very controversial issue. Only the ICTY
granted this unique protection measure in its proceedings. This measure will be an important
issue for the ICC to consider. Ultimately it will be the ICC chambers that will decide if
anonymity will be granted to witnesses.

VI.

PROVISIONS FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Crimes of sexual violence have become a major issue in the Tribunals. The ICTY Statute

specifically states that rape is a crime against humanity.131 The ICTR Statute also lists rape as a
crime against humanity, but then includes the sexual offenses of “rape, enforced prostitution, and
any form of indecent assault” as war crimes.132 The ICC does not differ from the ICTR, and
expressly states that crimes of sexual violence constitute Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes.133
A. General Discussion of Provisions for Victims of Sexual Violence under the ICC
The ICC has several provisions relating to victims of sexual violence. First, Article 68(1)
of the ICC states a number of factors that the Court must take into consideration when granting
“appropriate measures” of protection, including age, gender, health, and the nature of the crime,
131

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 5(g). [hereinafter ICTY Statute]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]
132

ICTR Statute, supra note 9, Article 3(g) and 4(e). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9]

133

Rome Statute, supra note 130, Article 7(g) and (8)(2)(b)(xxii). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 2]

32

like sexual violence.134 This, as will be shown below, is a novel rule to the Tribunals. Next,
Rule 68(2) states that special measures of protection shall be implemented in the case of a victim
of sexual violence.135 This rule is also novel and very important because it indicates that there is
a presumption for protective measures in cases of sexual violence. Thus, the burden is on the
defense to prove that the measures shouldn’t be afforded. Third, Rule 43(6) of the ICC states
that the Victims and Witnesses Unit shall include staff with expertise in trauma, including that
related to sexual violence crimes.136 In fact, this is so important to the ICC that its website
actually discusses the Victims and Witnesses Unit’s obligation to include staff with expertise in
trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.137 Fourth, Rule 71 states that a Chamber shall not
allow any evidence of a victim’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct.138 In short, these four
provisions show the ICC’s dedication to protecting victims of sexual violence.
B. History of Provisions for Victims of Sexual Violence
1. ICTY and ICTR
A report by the Secretary-General of the U.N. stated that there was a need to provide
protection to victims of rape and sexual assault in the former Yugoslavia.139 The ICTY has
heeded this report and has created certain provisions protecting victims of sexual violence,
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though some argue that it was due more to the efforts of non-governmental organizations which
focus on women’s war crime issues.140 Under Rule 96 of both the ICTY and ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, no corroboration of a rape victim’s testimony is required.141 It has been
noted that this Rule has been extremely important as it helps to prevent irrelevant, embarrassing,
or prejudicial evidence about rape victims from being heard in court. It also helps to prevent
harassment during cross-examination. This is basically a rape shield statute, which is common in
the United States. The ICTY was faced with victims of sexual violence in its first case.142 There,
in the Tadic case, the trial chamber worked especially hard to protect the victims of sexual
violence, and even went as far as to allow them to testify completely anonymously, as discussed
earlier in this memorandum.
The ICTY and ICTR also have implemented a protection measure in which a rape
victim’s previous sexual history or conduct is kept from being admitted into evidence.143 This
provision has the same effect as the previous provision that protects the victim from testifying
about embarrassing or prejudicial evidence. Moreover, it protects victims during crossexamination.
2. SCSL
The SCSL, on-the-other-hand, does not have the same provisions for victims of sexual
violence. Under Rule 96, the SCSL simply states that credibility, character, or predisposition to
140
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sexual availability cannot be inferred by a victim’s prior sexual conduct.144 Therefore, under the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the SCSL, the defense may admit a victim’s prior sexual
history into evidence, but it cannot use that prior history to question the credibility of the witness.
This rule could create situations that are embarrassing or even harassing to the victim. The ICC
also contains a very similar provision. However, unlike the SCSL, the ICC bolsters the provision
with Rule 71, as discussed above. Regardless, the SCSL has worked to protect victims of sexual
violence.145
Concerning Victims and Witnesses Units, the ICTY and ICTR both provide counseling
and support for victims of rape and sexual assault.146 The SCSL also provides that its Witnesses
and Victims Section also be staffed by experts in trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.147
Therefore, the ICC follows very closely with the other Tribunals in regards to staffing its Victims
and Witnesses Unit with personnel that are specifically trained to work with victims of sexual
violence crimes.
3. National Courts
Provisions for victims of sexual violence are not unique to the Tribunals. In Denmark,
for example, victims of rape or incest may request trials to be conducted on camera.148
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Moreover, both the Swiss and German judicial systems may prohibit the publication of the
identity of such victims.149
C. Benefits of Provisions for Victims of Sexual Violence
The fear for a witness’s safety can be especially acute for rape victims.150 As discussed
above, testifying in trial may embarrass many victims of sexual violence. Moreover, sexual
crimes are so psychologically disturbing that many victims are unwilling or even unable to
confront their assailants. However, in order to administer justice, the testimony of these victims
is vital to the trial process. Therefore, proper provisions must be in place to protect these
victims. The actual protection measures fall into the categories that have already been discussed
in this memorandum. The benefits of the extra provisions help ensure the protections needed for
victims of sexual violence are properly administered.
D. Possible Challenges of Provisions for Victims of Sexual Violence
The major challenge of providing proper protections for victims of sexual violence is
having a well-trained staff that is able to minister to these victims. A victim of sexual violence
has endured a most traumatic experience, and therefore needs special attention. Rule 43
addresses this situation by staffing the Victims and Witnesses Unit with trained professionals in
the area of sexual violence. In fact, Rule 43(6) has received much praise as it has been noted that
it is “absolutely crucial to have the Victims and Witnesses Sections staffed by trained,
competent, dedicated, and caring professionals, including professionals with expertise in gender
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crimes.”151 Therefore, the ICC’s challenge in creating special provisions for victims of sexual
violence is in assuring that properly trained professionals are employed who can deal with the
intense emotional trauma that sexual violence victims have endured.
E. Conclusion
Creating special provisions for victims of sexual violence will surely impact on the ICC’s
credibility. Sexual crimes will continue to be committed, and the ICC must not only be prepared
to prosecute those who commit these acts, but also be able to protect the victims of these heinous
crimes. The ICC, through its novel approaches as well as through established Tribunal
provisions, has created a positive change in international law. As one author stated, “This is no
doubt an important step forward in enhancing awareness, and sensitivity to the victims, of sexual
crimes.”152

VII.

REPARATIONS

The Rome Statute has made it possible for the ICC to order reparations to victims. As
will be discussed below, this is a significant departure from previous Tribunals, and one that will
have a major impact on the functioning of the ICC as well as on the shaping of international
criminal law. However, for the ICC to be successful in allowing for reparations to victims and
their families, there are still some very important issues that must be discussed and resolved.
A. General Discussion of Reparations under the ICC
The basic provisions regarding reparations under the ICC are found in Article 75 of the
Rome Statute and in Rules 94 – 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Article 75 of the
151
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Rome Statute gives the Court the power to order reparations to victims by convicted persons.153
The Court, either by request or in “exceptional circumstances” on its own motion, can determine
the amount and magnitude of damages, losses and injuries to victims.154 After this
determination, the Court, under Rule 98, can make an order for reparation against the convicted
person. Article 75 defines reparation as compensation, restitution and rehabilitation. As part of
the reparation process, the Court, under Article 75(3), may allow the offender, victims, and other
interested persons or states to represent their interests. Article 75(5) mandates that state parties
give effect to the reparation order. As part of this process of reparations, Article 79 provides for
the creation of a Trust Fund for the benefit of victims and their families. The Trust Fund may
obtain assets from voluntary contributions from the following: Governments, NGOs,
corporations, or private individuals; Fines and forfeitures assessed against the accused to the
Trust Fund; Resources collected through awards ordered by the Court; and Any other funds that
are transferred by State Parties.155
The idea of victim reparation is novel to international tribunals. The tribunals before the
ICC were created specifically for the punishment of international criminals. In essence, they
were “symbolic exercises of the victor over the vanquished.”156
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B. History of Reparations
1. ICTY and ICTR
Rule 105 of the ICTY and ICTR states that the trial chamber may determine the matter of
restitution of property taken unlawfully by the convicted.157 The Rule also states that the
Tribunals may submit a judgment to the appropriate national authorities to aid in the restitution.
This rule allows the national authorities to help the victim recover the restitution of property
under national legal systems.158 However, this rule has yet to be applied in either court system.
In fact, it has been stated that the provisions “were included in the Rules as a symbolic
afterthought rather than being expected to produce concrete results.”159 This was not the case
with the ICC, as Article 75 was negotiated for many years, and it was ultimately decided to insert
“shall” instead of “may” before “establish principles relating to reparations…”160
Moreover, Rule 106 of both Tribunals states that convicted persons are equally
responsible for compensation of victims under actions brought in national courts. Unfortunately,
this Rule has also been of little use.161 In Rwanda, many national court cases have awarded large
reparations to victims, but a lack of funds has curtailed enforcement. Carla del Ponte, the
ICTR’s Chief Prosecutor, was highly critical of the inadequate funds and stated a need for
change.162 Similarly, Judge Pillay and Judge Jorda, former Presidents of the ICTR and ICTY
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respectively, now at the ICC, echoed del Ponte’s frustrations and stated the need for development
of appropriate mechanisms for reparations.163 Both Presidents, though, decided against pursuing
mechanisms for reparations because they believed that it may hinder the respective Tribunal’s
main objective which is to prosecute those responsible for the heinous crimes committed in their
respective regions. This is strikingly dissimilar to the main objective of the ICC; the Preamble to
the Rome Statute states that State Parties must be “mindful that during this century millions of
children, women, and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity.”164 This change in perspective from simply prosecuting criminals to
protecting victims was not an abrupt occurrence.
2. International Conventions and Courts
The idea of reparations to victims in international law became a major source of
discussion in the last twenty years. The Netherlands Institute of Human Rights implored the
U.N. to create a mechanism that would provide for reparations to victims of human rights
violations. Theo van Boven, a member of the Netherlands Symposium, submitted a report on the
Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the UNCHR. His reports declared “the violation of any
human right gives rise to a right of reparation for the victim.”165 The American Convention on
Human Rights insists that State Parties ensure appropriate compensation for victims.166 The
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U.N.’s Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power
guarantees redress to individuals who have suffered physical and mental harm to person or
property.167 Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that effective remedies to
victims include both “payment of compensation where appropriate,” as well as, “punishment of
those responsible.”168 This background helped to lead the Victim’s Working Group to state in
1998, “There will be no justice without justice for victims. And in order to do justice to victims,
the ICC must be empowered to address their rights and needs.”169 The Permanent Court for
International Justice, in a famous opinion, stated:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act…is that
reparation must, so far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible,
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would
bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles
which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act
contrary to international law.170
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3. Truth Commissions
Reparations can take many forms, and not simply be restricted to monetary awards. In
fact, since it may be easily argued that no two victim’s needs are exactly alike,171 having only a
single form of reparation seems inadequate. This is very evident when one looks to the many
truth commissions created throughout the world. To date, over 14 countries have created either
truth commissions or other analogous bodies.172 Chile and Argentina each provided
compensation, rehabilitation and services to some, though not all, of the victims in their military
dictatorships.173 Chile also provided scholarships and free medical and psychological care for
children whose parents were killed or have disappeared.174
One may also look to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
created in the wake of the South African apartheid. One of the main bodies of the TRC was the
Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation (CRR). The CRR’s main function was to
recommend a policy to the government of South Africa regarding measures it should take to
provide reparations to the victims of the apartheid.175 The TRC ultimately recommended many
different forms of reparations. First, it recommended legal and administrative reparations: death
warrants, exhumations, reburials and ceremonies, provision of headstones and tombstones,
declarations of death, expungement of criminal records, and the expediting of outstanding legal
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matters.176 Second, the TRC recommended community reparations: renaming streets and
facilities, erecting memorials and monuments, and conducting culturally appropriate
ceremonies.177 Third, the TRC recommended national reparations, such as the erection of
memorials and monuments, and a day of remembrance.178 Fourth, it was recommended that
there be community rehabilitation, such as improving health services, social services, education,
and housing, and creating skills training courses and specialized trauma counseling.179 The TRC
final report also sought an official apology.180
There have been some complaints of the TRC. For example, many victims were
ultimately left out of the process and the South African government was slow to initiate any of
the TRC’s recommendations. However, as one author stated, “Perhaps the most important lesson
of the South African experience is that reparations come in many forms and that reparative
measures, whatever their form, should be valued.”181
El Salvador also created a Truth Commission after the eleven year war that tore the
country apart. The Truth Commission ultimately recommended that a monument be created, a
day of remembrance, and a follow-up body to monitor compliance with the recommendations.182
Plus, the commission recommended the establishment of a fund to compensate all victims, where
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at least 1% of all international assistance received from abroad be earmarked for such
compensation.183 Sadly, few of these recommendations were heeded. Instead, the Salvadoran
Legislature took formal action to reject the Truth Commission’s report.184
C. Benefits of Reparations
The benefits of reparations are obvious. First, the victims and their families can be
compensated for the terrible acts committed against them. This not only aids the victims, but it
is an extra punishment against the convicted criminals. Another benefit is that it allows victims
to feel whole again. In past tribunals, victims were only given the comfort of knowing that their
assailants were now incarcerated. However, this does little for victims who must return to their
war torn communities. Moreover, it certainly does nothing for families of victims who have lost
loved ones who provided for the family. Another benefit to offering reparations occurs when
victims are more willing to step forward to testify against their assailants. For example, victims
who must work to provide for their families may not chose to travel to the ICC to testify in a
potentially lengthy trial only to receive personal gratification in knowing they helped to
incarcerate the criminal. On-the-other-hand, if those victims are aware that reparations can be
received, they may be more willing to leave their families in the hopes that they will be
compensated for the crimes committed against them. Additionally, a victim fearful of testifying
against an accused may again be more willing if reparations are available.
Besides the direct benefits to the victims, offering reparations has additional benefits as
well. First, these reparations to victims will help the countries in which atrocities are committed.
The infusion of money into these countries can free up funds needed by the government to repair
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the country or region. Second, reparations may give more legitimacy to the Court as it seeks not
only to put criminals in jail, but also to care for the victims of terrible crimes. This legitimacy
may sway critics of the ICC, and could potentially turn a non-member country into a membercountry. Finally, allowing for reparations by the ICC will undoubtedly aid in molding
international law’s view on reparations for victims.
D. Possible Challenges of Reparations
1. Locating and Freezing Assets
There are multiple challenges to the idea of allowing for reparations by the ICC since
there is no precedent for this in international tribunals. First, locating and freezing assets is a
lengthy and intensive process. Unfortunately, hiding and shifting funds and money is not.185
Therefore, the Court will be forced to act as swiftly as possible to find, freeze and seize assets of
the convicted criminals. Fortunately, the Pre-Trial Chamber can take steps to freeze and/or seize
a suspect’s assets once a warrant or arrest or a summons is issued against that person.186 In order
for reparations to be effective, there must be national procedures in place to aid in the process.
Some State Parties have already initiated internal legislation dealing with cooperation with the
Court, including the freezing of assets. This comports with the Rome Statute that obligates State
Parties to cooperate in the “identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property
and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture.”187 Moreover,
State Parties must “take measures to recover the value of the proceeds, property or assets ordered
by the Court to be forfeited,” and have it transferred to the Court.188 Many parties have done this
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by involving an Attorney General or Public Prosecutor in the request. The French legislation
allows for measures to be conducted by the Paris State Prosecutor.189 Canada, on the other hand,
requires judge’s approval after application by the Attorney General.190 New Zealand allows for
the Attorney General to proceed if he or she is satisfied that the request relates to an international
crime that is being investigated by the ICC and there is tainted property located in New
Zealand.191
This problem is intensified when money is located in non-member States. Intelligent
criminals will know which States are not a part of the ICC and transfer funds to those States.
This makes it incumbent on the ICC to convince non-member States to cooperate with the Court
“on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such States or any other appropriate
basis,” as stated in Article 87(5)(a).192 If the Court can work with non-member states to agree to
freeze the assets of criminals being prosecuted by the ICC, a major step in ensuring the payment
of reparations to victims will be taken.
2. Limited Amounts of Funds
Another challenge to the Court occurs when only a limited amount of funds for
reparations exists. As one author stated, “It is clear that at this stage one cannot say that the
Trust Fund has a definitive and clear source of sufficient funding.”193 When one considers the
fact that there may be millions of victims of a specific instance of genocide, it would be
extremely difficult to make each victim or victim’s family whole again. In reality, it will be
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impossible for the Court to accurately predict “the number of victims who will be affected in
each case and what their corresponding level of financial need might be.”194 Therefore, the
Court will inevitably be faced with offering collective awards. Moreover, it may be difficult to
obtain assets from convicted criminals since it is very probable that these people will “not have
any assets to pay over, or they have successfully hid or ‘given away’ their assets.195 These
collective awards must utilize both the money seized from the accused, but also Trust Fund
assets, as discussed in Rule 98.
3. Consistently Allocating Reparations
Consistency in allotting reparations is a major challenge to the Court. As has been stated,
“The most important quality of the Trust Fund’s assessment methodology is consistency for each
of the victims in every case. Arbitrary, unfounded awards discredit the legitimacy of the Trust
Fund and the ICC as a legal institution.”196 The United States had several problems with victim
reparations after the September 11th attacks.197 The U.S. Government developed a very simple
system for compensating victims. The system applied a flat amount for pain and suffering and
added any expected earning capacity of the decedent had they not been killed.198 However, it
was found that this standardized assessment failed to adequately compensate many victims.
In order to be consistent, then, the Court must set guidelines for allotment of reparations.
One suggestion may be to create a scale with upper and lower limits set by the ICC and also a list
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of factors to evaluate where a victim should be placed on that scale. Such factors may include
the following: Actual physical harm to the person; Harm to property; Emotional distress; Pain
and suffering; Ability to live a productive life; Moral or Religious invasion; and Viewing crimes
against one’s family. Once the factors for reparations are in place, the Court can apply them to
the upper and lower limits created. The following is a simplified example:
The Court decides that the range of reparations will be from $100,000 to
$200,000 based on the following factors: Harm to person, Ability to live a
productive life, Harm to property, Pain and suffering, and Harm against one’s
family. Person A was raped repeatedly and then forced to watch her daughter be
raped. The accused then poured acid on Person A’s eyes, blinding her for life.
Afterwards, her family’s home was burned down. Person B had exactly the same
done to her, except she was not blinded. Under the criteria, Person A would be
awarded more than Person B.

By establishing appropriate criteria, the Court will gain legitimacy in this very sensitive
area. It was said that the ICC “must create flexible, consistent standards of assessing loss and
harm to victims that will take into account both tangible and intangible loss so that the awards
may be appropriately distributed.”199 This may be very difficult to accomplish. However, by
creating the appropriate criteria to base the reparations on, the Court will be consistent as well as
flexible while taking into account both tangible and intangible loss.
4. Evaluating True Victims
Unfortunately the notion of reparations will most likely attract imposters hoping to attain
money. The Court will have to evaluate all persons claiming to be victims. This is necessary for
two reasons. First, the Court will not want to award money to those not worthy of the
reparations, as doing so would quickly deplete the Trust Fund. Secondly, and arguably more
199
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importantly, imposter victims will give false testimony to convict the accused in order to acquire
reparations. Obviously, this will taint the trial and the Court. Therefore, the Registrar must take
appropriate measures to make sure those individuals making claims are truly victims.
5. Determining the Types of Reparations to be Administered
The many Truth Commissions created throughout the world have all recommended
multiple types of reparations for victims. The ICC must also decide what reparations are
appropriate for the victims that come before the court. Many times monetary relief will be either
inadequate or unreasonable depending on the crimes and the number of victims. Proper
reparations may prove problematic due to the ICC’s limited resources. Regardless, the ICC will
surely encounter countless victims, thus strengthening the need for more than simple monetary
awards. Instead, the ICC should look into community and national reparations that can benefit
more victims, especially those appearing at the ICC.
6. Getting Reparations to the Victims
Once money is allocated to victims, assurances must be made that the victims receive the
reparations. This will be a major problem in parts of the world where governments are too weak
to handle this burden, are corrupt, or fail to exist at all. This has, in fact, already occurred in
Kosovo.200 Unfortunately, these very circumstances exist in some of the governments where the
Court will operate. Moreover, if government officials committed the crimes, the Court will have
a difficult time trusting that the money will end up with the victims. Similarly, it may be
difficult for victims to even accept the money for fear of reprisal. As of yet, there seems to be no
clear answer to this problem. One possible solution is to have the Trust Fund and/or the
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Registrar determine if the country is too unstable to receive the reparations, and to determine an
alternate method to award the money to the victims.
7. Illegitimacy of the Court
The ICC seems to have two vital functions: Bring heinous criminals to justice; and protect
the victims of those crimes. In order for the Court to be successful, both objectives must be met
with success. The Court must understand this and treat reparations seriously. Meeting these
challenges with respect to reparations will bear on the legitimacy of the Court. If these
challenges are not met, critics of the Court will undoubtedly maintain that the Court is not a
legitimate body. Moreover, the very victims that the Court seeks to aid may feel that the court is
not legitimate if these challenges are not met.
E. Conclusion
The ICC’s provisions for victim reparations represent a major step forward in the
progression of international law. Reparations allow the Court to administer a form of justice
beyond prosecution of the criminal. However, there are some concerns that must be addressed in
order to ensure that offering reparations to victims becomes a positive aspect of the ICC. If the
ICC does not properly address these issues, it may lose credibility, not only with the victims, but
also with the international community.

VIII. CONCLUSION
This memorandum sought to discuss and analyze the different victim and witness
provisions implemented by the ICC by comparing them to similar provisions of the ICTY, ICTR,
and SCSL. The memorandum was broken into 6 major sections: Non-Disclosure of Identity;
Protection from Media and Public Photography, Video and Sketch; Protection from
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Confrontation with the Accused; Anonymity; Protections for Victims of Sexual Assault; and
Reparations to Victims. Each section identified and described the specific provisions relating to
the topic. The analysis focused on the general rights under the Tribunals as well as specific court
decisions from those Tribunals. Additional examples from national court systems including the
United States, Canada, Chile, Australia, South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights
were also included.
It is also clear from this analysis that victim and witness provisions have evolved from
the inception of the ICTY and continue to evolve through the creation of the ICC. The ICC has
developed extensive victim and witness provisions that mirror those established by the other
tribunals.
The other Tribunals have been utilizing victim and witness provisions since their
inception. In fact, the ICTY trial chambers have granted protective measures to between 85 and
90 percent of witnesses. 201 To date, the ICC has yet to hear a case and issue a decision, and it is
therefore still unknown how well the ICC will protect victims and witnesses.
This memorandum has provided an analysis of how victim and witness provision have
been implemented in the other Tribunals. It has also analyzed the benefits of each provision.
More importantly, this memorandum analyzed potential problems in implementing each
provision. By noting the benefits and understanding the possible shortcomings of each specific
provision, the ICC will be better able to implement the provisions deemed necessary for the
victims and witnesses whose lives have been impacted by the crimes that come before this Court.
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APPENDIX 1

ICC
Rule 76 allows for
this, though it does
not specifically
state the deadline
for disclosing
identification to
the opposing
party.

ICTY
Rule 69 allows for
this, though, only the
Prosecutor may
request this. The
Court in Prosecutor
v. Perisic stated that
prosecutor must
disclose no later than
30 days before trial.

ICTR
Article 21 allows
for this, and either
party can apply to
the trial chamber
for this under Rule
60. Rule 60 also
allows the trial
chamber to consult
with the Victims
and Witnesses
Support Unit. The
Court in
Prosecutor v.
Kajelijeli ruled that
disclosure must
occur no later than
21 days before
trial.

Protection
from Media
and Public

Rule 87(3)
specifically allows
for this protection,
similarly to the
ICTY and ICTR.

Rule 75 specifically
allows for this
protection.

Rule 75
specifically allows
for this protection.

Protection
from
Confrontation
with Accused

Rule 87(3)(c)
allows for
testimony through
videoconferencing
and closed-circuit
television.

The Court in
Prosecutor v. Tadic
ruled that even
though Rule 75
allows for testimony
through closed
circuit television, the
Court would install
screens to protect
witnesses from
seeing the accused.

Anonymity

This is not
specifically stated
in the Rules of
Procedure and
Evidence.
However, Article
68 of the Rome

Article 20(1) states
that witness
protection measures
must be in full
respect for the rights
of the accused. But,
the Court in

NonDisclosure of
Identity
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SCSL
Rule 69 allows for
this, and either
party can apply to
the trial chamber
for this. The Court
in Prosecutor v.
Gbao ruled that
disclosure will
occur on a rolling
basis and must
occur no later than
42 days prior to the
testimony of the
witness. This was
shortened in
Prosecutor v.
Norman to a 21
day rolling basis.

Rule 75
specifically allows
for this protection,
but adds “video
link or other
technology” to
possible testimony
procedures.
Rule 75 allows for The Court in
appropriate
Prosecutor v.
measures to
Sesay allowed
facilitate the
witnesses to testify
testimony of
from behind
vulnerable victims screens. Also,
and witnesses, such Rule 75 allows for
as one-way closed
witnesses to testify
circuit television.
from outside of the
courtroom via
video link.
The Court has not
yet ruled on this
issue

The Court has not
yet ruled on this
issue

Statute states that
protection
measures must not
be prejudicial to or
inconsistent with
the rights of the
accused and a fair
and impartial trial.

Protections
for Victims of
Sexual
Assault

Reparations
to Victims

Rule 68(1) states
that the nature of
the crime must be
considered when
granting protective
measures. Rule
68(2) states that
measures of
protection shall be
implemented for
victims of sexual
assault.
Rule 43(6) states
that the Victims
and Witnesses
Unit shall include
staff with expertise
in sexual violence
crimes.
Rule 75 allows for
reparations to
victims, including
restitution,
compensation and
rehabilitation.
Rule 79
specifically calls
for the
establishment of a
trust fund.

Prosecutor v. Tadic
ruled that anonymity
is allowed. The
court created 5
criteria in deciding to
allow for anonymous
testimony as well as
4 guidelines to be
followed during
anonymous
testimony.
Rule 96 states that no
corroboration of the
victim’s testimony
shall be required and
no prior sexual
conduct of the victim
shall be admitted.

Rule 105 states that
restitution may be
ordered. However,
this has never been
administered.
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Rule 96 states that
no corroboration of
the victim’s
testimony shall be
required and no
prior sexual
conduct of the
victim shall be
admitted.

No sexual conduct
of the victim shall
be admitted.
The Victims and
Witnesses Unit
shall include staff
with expertise in
sexual violence
crimes.

Rule 105 states that Does not allow for
reparations
restitution may be
ordered. However,
this has never been
administered.

